Abstract. This paper contributes to the finance-growth literature by examining the political economy origins of some of the most successful financial markets in Europe and Asia. It provides historical evidence from London, Amsterdam and Hong Kong that highlights the essential role played by the government sector in kick-starting financial development. We show that the emergence of financial systems did not occur through laissez-faire approaches and that secure property rights alone were not sufficient for financial development. In the cases of London and Amsterdam, governments created large trade monopolies which were responsible for all the major financial innovations of the time. In the case of Hong Kong, where the financial development model was bank-based, large banking monopolies with close links to the state were created. We argue, the three examples are not special cases and the role of government in the early stages of financial development has been widespread world-wide.
Introduction
A broad consensus has emerged in the finance-growth literature suggesting that well functioning banking systems and capital markets help to enhance long-run growth.
1 Moreover, the positive causal impact of finance on growth appears to have been present from the earliest stages of financial development in the Netherlands, England, United States and Japan (Rousseau 2002) . This literature is, therefore, increasingly shifting its focus towards understanding the mechanisms that promote financial development. Recent contributions suggest that political economy factors, such as the role of industrial and financial incumbents, may hold the key to successful financial development. Rajan and Zingales (2003) , for example, suggest that trade and financial openness, which curtail the power of incumbents and change their incentives, may be a useful mechanism of financial development. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a) sketch a dynamic political economy framework in which economic institutions that facilitate economic development are social decisions chosen for their consequences by the interaction between powerful political and economic forces. These authors strongly emphasize the role of broad based property rights protection for economic development in general and the development of financial markets in particular. Much of this literature utilizes a variety of stylised facts or historical examples, mainly drawn from the colonial period, which are primarily aimed at explaining the factors that explain institutional development in the 'colonies'. With one important exception (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005b) there has been little attempt to gain an understanding of the factors that explain successful financial development in the colonizing powers themselves. This paper aims to contribute to the finance-growth literature by examining the political economy origins of some of the most successful financial markets in Europe and Asia, drawing on a variety of historical sources. Specifically, it provides historical evidence primarily from London, but also from Amsterdam and Hong Kong, that 1 See Levine (2003) and Demetriades and Andrianova (2004) for recent surveys of this literature. 1 highlights the essential role played by the government sector in kick-starting financial development. While there are important differences between these examples, we show that the emergence of financial systems did not occur through laissez-faire approaches and that secure property rights alone were not sufficient for financial development. In the cases of London and Amsterdam governments created large trade monopoliesthe English East India Company and its Dutch equivalent-which became the leading joint-stock companies and were responsible for all the important financial innovations of the time, including the emergence of trade in shares. In the case of Hong Kong, where the financial development model was bank-based, large banking monopolies with close links to the state were created (e.g. the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation). These were modelled on the Bank of England-itself a banking monopoly for fifty years with close links to government-which also became a template for the development of many other banking systems around the world (Goodhart 1988).
We argue that the three examples we provide in this paper are not special cases.
The role of government in the early stages of financial development has been widespread world-wide, including the Italian city-states of Venice and Genoa, the United States, and, more recently, in the newly industrialized East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
The idea that the government can play an important positive role in the financial system is of course not a new one, see for example Stiglitz (1993) . What is new in our paper is that the emergence itself of successful financial systems owes a lot to the involvement of governments, an aspect that has been neglected by previous literature on finance and growth. We find support for our view in the writings of classical economists. Adam Smith has been widely quoted for emphasising the importance of protecting property rights. However, his other important point, often overlooked, was that the security of property rights alone is not sufficient for economic development. Instead he believed that there must be government involvement in business.
He pointed out that "property and civil government very much depend on one an-2 other..." and "...the preservation of property and the inequality of possession first formed it, and the state of property must always vary with the form of government..." (Smith 1763) . Specifically, Smith argued that the government should erect and maintain certain public works and certain public institutions, "which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals to maintain because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals..." (Smith 1776, p. 688) . Here, by 'public works' Smith refers to companies (or new property rights) created by Royal (and later parliamentary) charter. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 documents the emergence of London as a financial market, highlighting the role of politics, institutions and finance, which include the rise of the trading and banking monopolies with close links to government.
Sections 3 and 4 analyse the cases of Amsterdam and Hong Kong, while Section 5 highlights other cases. Finally, Section 6 summarises and concludes.
The Emergence of London as a Financial Market
A variety of historical sources suggest that London's stock market emerged during the latter part of the 17th century and continued to develop during the early part of the 18th century. Drawing on these sources, this section documents (i) the emergence of trading in stocks; (ii) the institutional changes that, as has been previously argued, facilitated the development of the stock market, (iii) the improvement in public finances and its relationship to stock market development. In so doing, it identifies the key players in the private and public sectors in this process, namely the leading joint stock companies, the monarch and parliament. This examination reveals the following two inter-related political economy aspects, which played a critical role in the emergence of London as a major financial market:
• The monopoly rights granted by the public sector (initially by the monarch and subsequently by parliament) to all the leading joint stock companies.
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• The long-term loans provided by the leading joint stock companies to the public sector in exchange for their monopoly positions.
Additionally, our analysis also highlights the role of foreign trade in the process, in the light of the fact that all but one of the leading joint stock companies in that period were involved in trade with different parts of the world.
The Emergence of Trading in Stocks: 1661-1703
Even though the London Stock Exchange was formally established in 1773, there is evidence of stock transfers taking place as early as 1661 while the publication of security price movements began in 1681.
2 Scott (1912)-one of the most authoritative historical studies of the emergence of joint-stock companies in Britain and
Ireland-provides, among other rich information, a useful list of tables described as Source: Carruthers (1996 , Table 7 .1, p. 167) and Carlos, Key and Dupree (1998, p. 326, p. 337) them by the monarch in their charter. The EIC was granted monopoly rights over all English trade to the east of the Cape of Good Hope. The RAC was given monopoly rights over all English trade from Sallee to the Cape of Good Hope. Hudson's Bay
Company, incorporated in 1670, had a monopoly over trade in the region watered by streams flowing into Hudson Bay in Canada.
The stock exchange was highly localised, with the trades and the circulation of information about the current share prices and profitability prospects for joint stock companies taking place in the coffee houses of Exchange Alley. Table 1 shows that a market for EIC shares existed as early as 1661, while trade in the shares of the other two companies emerged in the 1670s, soon after their establishment.
In 1694 the Bank of England (BoE) was established by parliamentary statute which provided it with a monopoly right to issue paper money and to take deposits.
With an initial capital of £1.2 million, BoE overtook RAC as the second largest jointstock company. By the end of 1695 there were in excess of 140 joint stock companies with a total market capitalisation of £4.25 million. 4 50.3% of stock market capitalisation or £2.14 million was accounted for by three foreign-trading companies (EIC, RAC and Hudson's Bay). The BoE's capitalisation was £0.72 million or 16.9% of total market capitalisation. Thus, between them these four monopolists accounted for more than two thirds of stock market capitalisation, while other chartered companies (also monopolies in their spheres of activity) accounted for 10.0% of the market.
Monopolies, therefore, accounted for more than three quarters of the capitalisation of the emerging stock market.
By 1703 total stock market capitalisation had reached £8.5 million. By that time the East India Company had been absorbed by the New East India Company (NEIC), which was initially set up to rival the old EIC. 5 The combined stock of the two companies accounted for 26.6% of total market capitalisation. The second and third largest joint stock companies were BoE, which accounted for 21.2% of the market, and RAC which accounted for 13%. Thus, even by 1703 the three largest monopolies accounted for over 60% of stock market capitalisation. Smith (1929) quotes historical documents which provide evidence that a specialised class of stock brokers was developing in the latter part of the 17th century;
4 See Scott (1912, Vol. I, p. 336) . Although it is known that 150 joint-stock companies were in existence by the end of 1695, due to fragmentary information for some of these companies it is possible to estimate total market capitalisation for only 140 of these.
5 Even though The New East India Company was initially set up to compete with the 'old' East India Company, and succeeded in being granted monopoly rights over the trading route to India by parliament, the two companies traded in parallel for a short period and eventually merged in 1702.
During their co-existence trade with India was managed by a joint committee, i.e. it appears that they acted jointly as a monopolist (Scott 1912, Vol. III, p. 479) . Moreover, it appears that monopoly was the modus operandi for all the leading joint-stock companies at the time.
Politics, Institutions and Finance
The emergence and steady expansion of the stock market in the 1670s and 1680s
in London, as discussed above, prompts the question: What were the factors that brought about the market emergence? A well-established explanation of the development of financial markets in England, due to North and Weingast (1989) , highlights the credibility of secure property rights, following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 when constitutional changes substantially shifted the power in favour of parliament and away from the monarch. 6 In England under the Stuarts, the monarch was expected to fund the government ("live of his own") and had considerable discretionary power, largely unchecked by Parliament, to obtain funds for the Crown. As England was embroiled in the wars of the late 16th (the war with Spain in 1588, with its lasting debt legacy well after Elisabeth's death) and the first half of the 17th centuries, the legacy of financing the war effort left a chronic gap between the Crown's revenue and expenditure and was forcing the monarchy to search for ever-inventive ways of 6 For a detailed historical account of political and economic realities of the 17th century England see Smith (1984) and Holmes (1993) . A compact but highly informative account can also be found in Roseveare (1991 Act were passed, while the fiscal constraints on the crown were firmly established by 1697 with Parliament given the power to authorise taxation and audit revenues.
There is consensus in the literature (see North and Weingast (1989) accounts, which severely limited the ability of the monarch to over-spend. Moreover, increased accountability resulted in certain taxes being earmarked for meeting public debt obligations, which made the commitment to repay debt credible.
It has also been argued by North and Weingast (1989) that these institutional reforms were a legal milestone for the development of private capital markets, essentially by strengthening the security of property rights. However, this is a controversial interpretation of these reforms. Undoubtedly, to the extent that the reforms following 1688 enhanced the security of property rights, they must have also strengthened investors' confidence and (together with other characteristics of the early 18th century economic and political life in England) contributed to the growth of financial markets. However, the active exchange of company shares, documented in Section 2.1, was taking place well before the Glorious Revolution. The increasing trend in the transfers of company shares over 1660-1688 (see Table 1 ) suggests that investors felt sufficiently secure to be willing to undertake the trades. Hence the emergence and expansion of the stock market in Exchange Alley in the 1670s and 1680s calls for a different explanation.
The North and Weingast interpretation of the implications of 1688 for private capital markets has also been questioned by economic historians, political scientists and sociologists. Stasavage (2002) , for example, suggests that the multiple veto points introduced by the reforms were neither necessary nor sufficient for the credibility of commitment and that partisan politics played a much more important role. Critique by Carruthers (1996) to buy and sell securities, where to buy and sell etc. They conclude that even financial regulation had its roots in investor's learning: "this learning must also have provided the experience that allowed investors to deal with various financial crises in terms of regulation rather than market rejection" (p. 343).
The Improvement in Public Finances
Up to 1688, crown borrowing was short-term and was mainly carried out through goldsmith bankers. 8 Government debt amounted to no more than £1 million, which severely constrained government spending. 9 There was a chronic gap between government revenues and government expenditure which hindered the ability of the monarch to sustain a strong army. 10 As a result England was weak as a military power. From the 1690s onwards the volume of government long-term borrowing expanded very substantially, resulting in government debt rising from £1 million in 1688 to £16.7 million by 1697.
11 Table 2 , which portrays the sources of government long-term borrowing during 1693-1698, shows that this period witnessed a remarkable increase in the ability of the government to raise long-term loans.
Interestingly, the largest two loans raised by the government during this period were from the New East India Company (NEIC) and the Bank of England, amounting to £2.0 million and £1.2 million, respectively. These loans were provided at the same time the two companies were incorporated by parliamentary statute. This was not a coincidence. In the case of the NEIC Scott (1912) states that "The original capital consisted of 1,662,000 lent to the government, out of a total of 2,000,000, which carried the monopoly of the trade to India" (p. 479). There is, therefore, clear evidence that the loan to government was granted by the NEIC in a direct exchange 8 Forced loans from wealthy corporate bodies such as EIC or the Corporation the City of London were also important sources of funds for the Crown (Roseveare 1991, p. 23).
9 North and Weingast (1989, Table 3 , p. 822).
10 Carruthers (1996, Ch. 3).
11 North and Weingast (1989, The rest were used by the Exchequer as cash.
Source: Dickson (1967, pp. 48-9) for the monopoly rights over the trading route to India.
In a similar vein, the Bank of England provided the whole of its initial capital of £1.2 million as a long-term loan to the government directly in exchange for its monopoly license. Scott (1912) describes the bargaining between parliament, which was trying to raise funds for the war with France (the war of Spanish succession), and the two major syndicates with different political affiliations that were bidding to secure the monopoly right of circulating paper money during 1692-1693. One of these was led by Chamberlain, who was affiliated to the Tories (who then represented the interests of landowners). The other syndicate, led by Paterson, who was affiliated to the Whigs (otherwise known as the 'moneyed men'), was the one that succeeded through a revised proposal which provided a loan to the government of £1.2 million at 8%. 12, 13 Historical sources therefore suggest that parliament actively encouraged bids for the granting of valuable monopoly 'licenses' to joint stock companies led by individuals with political connections.
The loans provided by the NEIC and the Bank of England to the government were perhaps the largest at the time but were by no means exceptional. They were very much the normal way in which the business of public finance was conducted in those days. Carruthers (1996, p. 76) aptly summarises the relationship between the joint stock companies and the government in the 1690s:
"Joint stock companies enjoyed special privileges and monopoly power granted by the state and in exchange for this they customarily made a financial contribution. What distinguished this period from earlier ones was the sheer volume of borrowing from companies, and the fact that company shares could be easily traded on the London stock market. In contrast with annuities and lottery loans [the other two prominent methods of government borrowing at the time], and unlike shares in earlier times, by the late seventeenth century company equity was easily transferable to third parties.
Through joint-stock companies, public finance became linked to private finance and to the London stock market."
It can therefore be concluded that the emergence of London's stock market undoubtedly contributed to the improvement in public finances. It may also be argued that granting monopoly licenses to the companies that provided loans to the government made these companies more profitable, which in turn made it easier for them to raise capital. Thus, the development of the stock market went hand in hand with the improvement in public finances.
12 The capital was raised through subscriptions that were limited to £10,000 per person; the subscription lists opened on 21 June 1694 offered a discount to early subscribers; the issue was sold by 2 July 1694.
13 Interestingly, this loan was never repaid (Carruthers 1996, p. 80).
Trade and Growth
A variety of sources suggest that the period after 1660 was characterised by an expansion in trade and a rise in real incomes. Holmes (1993) describes the period between the late 1660s and 1690 as the English 'Commercial Revolution', which was characterised by an acceleration of trends already in evidence before 1660. He ascribes the acceleration in trade in large part to government measures such as the new navigation policy, legislation that was highly protective of English shipping.
14 Contributing factors were also the acquisition of the Carolinas and the further development of existing
colonies. An outstanding feature of the commercial revolution was the expansion of trade beyond Europe, particularly 'the plantations' in North America and the West Indies in the west and India in the east, through the EIC trading posts. Holmes (1993) suggests that the total tonnage of English merchant shipping increased from 162,000 tons in 1629 to 340,000 tones in 1686.
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Estimates of trade statistics by Davis (1954) show that total exports increased from 4.1 million in 1663-69 to 6.4 million in 1699-1701, representing an increase of over 50%, while total imports increased from 4.4m to 5.8m during the same period.
The Role of Monopolies
The large monopolies appear to have been efficient forms of organising overseas trade (in the case of EIC, RAC and Hudson's Bay) and banking activities (in the case of the BoE). The companies evidently enjoyed economies of both scale and scope.
In the case of the trading monopolies, there were operational economies of scale largely due to security considerations which, among other things, dictated creating 14 The 1660 Act for encouraging and increasing of shipping and navigation was aimed at breaking Dutch dominance and boosting the merchant fleet by introducing selective prohibitions or deterrents in using 'foreign' ships e.g. double custom duties on imports if not transported in English-owned or manned ships, prohibition of using 'foreign' ships in all trade with the 'plantations'.
15 See also Carruthers (1996, Ch. 5, fn. 1).
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and maintaining a private army, a right stipulated in their charter of incorporation.
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The state was reluctant to offer protection to these companies in overseas territories because it wanted to avoid unnecessary wars.
17
The trading technology itself exhibited economies of both scale and scope in that there were large set up costs in establishing trading outposts along a particular trading route, which however facilitated the expansion of trade into neighbouring regions.
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In addition, the large size of these monopolies, particularly the EIC, created financial efficiencies that were responsible for financial innovations that arguably were responsible for the emergence of the financial market. In the early years of the EIC (up to the 1650s), the company raised capital for each voyage, at the end of which the This may well explain why the BoE lost its monopoly status after fifty years of operation as a result of competitive pressures.
Even though monopolies were efficient forms of organisation at the time, they did not result in the creation of economic oligarchies because their ownership was broad-based. This also meant that they could mobilise saving by raising capital from a large number of investors. Table 3 as many as 89 shareholders by 1720. Scott (1912, Vol. III, pp. 464-7, 472-3, 476-7) .
The granting of monopoly rights to joint-stock companies was not uncontroversial.
Nevertheless, it was felt that on balance these monopolies were beneficial forms of Trading in the stocks of these companies emerged well before 1688 suggesting that private property rights were sufficiently secure before the Glorious Revolution.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 was clearly a legal milestone for the improvement in public finances, which became evident after 1688. Lending to government became more secure after 1688, which may have had an indirect influence on the development of the stock market. Specifically, the government was able to raise long term loans from joint stock companies in exchange for the granting (or renewing) of monopoly licenses. Both the NEIC and the BoE loans were cases in point. To the extent that the monopoly licenses made these companies more profitable, it can also be argued that the need to improve public finances contributed to the further development of the stock market.
There is therefore little doubt that the emergence of London's financial market was far from spontaneous, owing much to the interplay between politics and economics, which resulted in the formation of large trade monopolies with close links to government. While various kings received "forced" loans and "gift" loans in return for granting monopoly rights to EIC and RAC during the early part of the 17th century (Scott 1912, Vol. II), it appears that by the end of the same century its benefits for public finances were well understood by parliament. What can also be concluded from our analysis is that the much discussed influence of the institutional reforms of 1688 on the development of the stock market was, at best, an indirect one.
The same monopoly companies that accounted for the emergence of London as a financial market can also be credited for the improvement in public finances, as well as the expansion of trade. The rise in real incomes which followed the expansion of trade created additional wealth, setting in motion a virtuous finance-trade-growth cycle which transformed England from a weak state in the early part of the 17th century to Europe's foremost military power by the beginning of the 18th century.
Amsterdam
A pre-cursor of the London stock market, the Amsterdam stock exchange, from its establishment dominated by trade in the shares of the Dutch East India Company, can be seen as the end-product of a natural experiment progressing along quite dissimilar lines, when compared to London, yet producing a remarkably similar relationship between the state, the foreign trading monopoly and the emergence of the stock market.
The Dutch example differs from the English one in several important respects.
In the historical period of interest, the Netherlands, or more precisely the United 21 It is also important to note that the company was subject to supervision, and its charter to periodic renewal, by the States General. 22 In fact, the amalgamation of individual companies was as much an economic act as it was a political act, since the managerial group of the united company had close affiliation and unity of interests with the political authorities (Steensgaard 1982) . The historical sources, therefore, strongly suggest that "the VOC was the creation of the Dutch state, as much as of the merchants who had actually opened up the East India traffic" (Israel 1989, p. 72) . 23 The perception of the VOC as the extension of the state in the farflung territories of Asia, in fact, led to some discontent among investors who felt that "the profit was being sacrificed to the political objectives of the Dutch state" (Israel 1989, p. 72), with substantial amounts of the company funds being spent on arms, 21 In 1751, a century and a half later, commenting on the might of the VOC at the zenith of its economic and political power, Malachy Postlethwayt asserted in the Universal Dictionary: "one of the reasons why the Dutch East India company flourishes, and is become the richest and most powerful of all others we know of, is its being absolute, and invested with a kind of sovereignty and dominion, ...
[it] makes peace and war at pleasure, and by its own authority; administers justice to all; ... settles colonies, builds fortifications, levies troops, maintains numerous armies and garrisons, fits out fleets, and coins money". Cit. op. Neal (1990a, p. 196) .
22 Israel (1989, p. 71) documents that "the charter stressed that the VOC's purpose was not just to enable all subjects of 'these United Provinces' to invest in the East India traffic, but also to attack the power, prestige, and revenues of Spain and Portugal in Asia".
23 A distinguished historian of the Dutch East India Company, Niels Steensgaard suggests that "The VOC integrated the functions of a sovereign power with the functions of a business partnership.
Political decisions and business decisions were made within the same hierarchy of company managers and officials, and failure or success was always in the last instance measured in terms of profit.
By these means the company as a business venture was able to internalise protection costs, and protection costs were added to overheads that might be calculated rationally" (Steensgaard 1982, p. 237) . guilders."
In conclusion, what this example illustrates is that the way the monopoly was obtained (be it by the Royal Charter granted by a monarch in England or the charter drawn up following fierce negotiations between the merchants and political elite of the independent federal states in the United Provinces) was not as important as the 24 A more detailed picture could be seen in Steensgaard (1982, p. 247) .
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purpose it was assigned by the state: to consolidate the trading profits which could then be relied upon in the state of either peace or war, and which at any rate the government could tap in for the purpose of state-and empire-building. The trading monopoly in both London and Amsterdam was the vital ingredient in generating substantial resources for the government at the early stages of financial development.
The substantial resources were creating the virtuous cycle of growth and development:
greater resources allowed the monopoly to fortify its operations and reap greater profits, which made the trading in company shares increasingly more desirable; the increasing profitability of shares led to increased volume and innovation in share trading and that fostered stock market emergence and expansion.
Hong Kong
The financial development in Hong Kong in the 19th century, in contrast to that of The ordinance was for the term of 21 years, renewable on expiry.
would be accepted by colonial government treasuries (e.g. in payment of government dues and taxes). The latter lent credibility of the note issue with the general public.
Incorporation by the special ordinance, therefore, implied a kind of endorsement by the British government of the Hongkong Bank and of its notes, and that came at the price of the bank agreeing to provisions which ensured the public's ability to encash the bank's banknotes.
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In the 1860s, the Hongkong Bank was one of only two private banks enjoying the privilege of note issue in Hong Kong. Venice exhibited all three features, even though there were some important differences between the two.
Genoa and Venice had in place different commitment mechanisms that enabled them to issue long-term debt. Venice set aside specific tax revenues to service the public debt; while early period loans to the state were compulsory and based on income, they subsequently became voluntary. In Genoa, which was more politically divided than Venice, the commitment mechanism passed through the national bank Finally, both Genoa and Venice, but especially the former were financial innovators. Genoas San Giorgio invented the debt-equity swap and both cities understood the relationship between reputation and cost of debt. In Genoa there was an active money market in which merchants used declared but not matured interest on government debt to settle due payments and to extend short-term credit.
U.S. state banks
Even in the United States the role of the government in the early stages of financial development was an important one. Sylla, Legler and Wallis (1987) outline the 'intimate' relationships which existed between state banks and state governments, whereby state-chartered banks became integral elements of public finances between 1790 and 1860. In several instances, such banks were either wholly owned or operated by state governments, but even when this was not the case, states purchased bank shares either when a bank was launched or at a later stage. This was very much a two-way relationship not unlike the relationships that were common during the emergence of London's financial system in that (state) governments, at the time of granting or renewing charters, were obliging state-chartered banks to pay lump sum bonuses to them. Sylla et al. (1987) find that about one fifth of state revenues during that period was derived from banks.
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historians are in virtual agreement that it was patterned after the Venetian Banco della Piazza di Rialto of 1587.
33 Rousseau and Sylla (2005) show that the same period in the US history of financial development was characterized by finance-led growth, suggesting that these 'intimate' relationships between banks and state governments were conducive to economic growth.
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Japan, Korea and Taiwan
The emergence of strong banking systems that supported the remarkable growth of post-war Japan and Taiwan and post-1960's South Korea is well documented in recent literature. It is also widely recognised that the role of government in the early stages of the financial development of these countries was critical (see, for example, World
Bank (1993), Amsden (1989) , Wade (1989) and Wade (1990) ). The banking systems of these countries, which were tightly controlled by their respective governments for at least two decades, if not more, are widely credited with transforming their respective economies into the industrialised nations that they are today (Patrick and Park 1994).
Government interventions took many forms, including partial or total ownership of major banks, extensive government involvement in credit allocation, interest rate controls etc.
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What is perhaps less widely emphasised in the literature on East Asian financial development is the fact that certain forms of government interventions-such as restrictions on entry-amounted to restrictions on competition, which helped tightly controlled banks to remain profitable. This also enabled governments to use them as cheap sources of finance not so much for themselves but for their priority industrial sectors, which were central in their industrialisation strategies. Moreover, restrictions on competition did not result in a reduced volume of loans because of the parallel existence of interest rate controls, which effectively guaranteed gross profit margins for banks (see Kitagawa and Kurosawa (1994) ). In such a set-up banks could increase profit by increasing volume, which encouraged financial development by enhancing 34 Teranishi (1994) outlines the emergence of the Japan's heavily regulated financial system during the high growth period and analyses the ways in which it contributed to economic growth, focusing on the realization of dynamic scale economies. Park and Kim (1994) 
Conclusions
This paper provides evidence from historical sources which suggests that the emergence of London and Amsterdam's financial markets can be ascribed to the rise of large trading monopolies with close links to government. These monopolies were responsible for the main financial innovations that gave rise to the emergence of trading in shares. We argue that London and Amsterdam were not special cases in the sense that government has played a critical role in the emergence of financial systems
worldwide.
An important feature of the trading monopolies in London and Amsterdam was their broad based ownership which enabled them to mobilise saving from a wide class of investors. The monopoly position seems to have been critical in enabling them to issue securities with attractive risk-return characteristics, which, as a result, were easily tradable, giving rise to a secondary market. In this context, the establishment of banking monopolies with close links to government seems to have been a natural consequence and it is the prevalence of such monopolies that facilitated the emergence of banking systems worldwide.
The evidence presented here also suggests that the London market emerged well before the strengthening of private property rights that followed the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England. While this finding does not suggest that property rights are not necessary for the emergence of financial market-they may have been secure before 1688-it does suggest that ascribing the emergence of the London stock market opment through government owned banks (Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland 2008) .
to the reforms of 1688 is incorrect.
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Could the models of Amsterdam and London be mimicked by countries that remain financially underdeveloped today? The VOC and East India models suggest that careful exploitation of a valuable natural resource-trading routes in those casesmay help to mobilise saving and improve public finances, both of which may be critical to kick start financial development. Whether this avenue is open to low income economies in a modern context is an important question for policy makers which warrants further investigation, both theoretically and empirically. A tentative prediction of our analysis is that countries endowed with valuable tradable resources, such as oil or gas, which also have sufficiently secure private property rights may be able to kick start their financial systems through careful government intervention.
Specifically, inviting bids for monopoly licenses for the exploitation of such resources from domestic investors could deliver benefits for both the government and domestic private sectors, as long as ownership of such monopolies is broad based. This is an important caveat. If this vital ingredient of the London and Amsterdam models is neglected, the formation of such monopolies would not only fail to mobilise saving but it could also result in the creation of new economic oligarchies that are likely to stifle financial development for a long time.
As a final remark, the analysis of the emergence of financial markets in London and Amsterdam and the emergence of banking in Hong Kong, can also be related to recent work by North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) [henceforth, NWW] . The key concepts in NWW are the 'natural state' and the 'open access state'. The natural state is characterised by limited access in the sense that it provides order by "using the political system to limit economic entry to create rents, and then using the rents to stabilize the political system and limit violence". The most important mechanism of a limited access order is to contain violence and to provide social stability and 38 Haber et al. (2003) argue that selective enforcement of property rights by the government can serve as a substitute for uniform property rights enforcement (provided by the government as a public good) and could deliver economic growth even in the presence of political instability.
order. Such system, however, fails to achieve sustained economic growth: according to 
